Sam Bankman-Fried’s downfall is full

Table of Contents

what is DMA (Direct Market Access)in the Indian share market?

What is DMA?

DMA, or Direct Market Access, is a service offered by stockbrokers that allows traders to place orders directly on the stock exchange’s order book. It eliminates the need for intermediaries, such as market makers or brokers, and provides traders with direct access to the market. This means that orders are executed faster and at potentially better prices.

How Does DMA Work in the Indian Share Market?

In the Indian share market, DMA is facilitated through the use of technology and trading platforms provided by stockbrokers. Traders can access the market through these platforms, which connect them directly to the stock exchange.

Benefits of DMA in the Indian Share Market

1. Speed and Efficiency: DMA enables faster order execution as orders are placed directly on the exchange’s order book. This can be particularly advantageous in volatile market conditions where every second counts.

Conclusion

DMA, or Direct Market Access, is a powerful tool that allows traders to directly access the stock exchange’s order book. In the Indian share market, DMA offers numerous benefits, including speed, transparency, control, lower costs, and access to real-time market data. By utilizing DMA, traders can enhance their trading experience and potentially improve their trading outcomes.

IT TOOK A jury simply 4 hours to deliberate on the seven, sophisticated expenses of monetary fraud dealing with Sam Bankman-Fried, the founding father of FTX, a cryptocurrency trade. They needed to parse what would make him responsible of defrauding his clients and his lenders; and of conspiring with others to commit securities fraud, commodities fraud and money-laundering. After 15 days of testimony they’d clearly heard sufficient. They convicted him of each depend. He faces a most sentence of 110 years in jail.

Solely a 12 months has elapsed since FTX imploded. In its heyday the trade was one of many world’s largest, with hundreds of thousands of consumers and billions of {dollars} in buyer funds. It was seen as the way forward for crypto—a high-tech providing from an excellent wunderkind who wished to play good with regulators and usher in an period wherein the business went mainstream. However on November 2nd 2022 CoinDesk, a crypto information outlet, revealed a leaked balance-sheet. It confirmed that Alameda, FTX’s sister hedge fund additionally based by Mr Bankman-Fried, held few belongings aside from a handful of illiquid tokens he had invented. Spooked clients started to drag holdings from the trade. Inside days it had grow to be an all-out run and FTX had stopped assembly withdrawal requests. Prospects nonetheless had $8bn deposited on the trade. After frantically attempting to boost funds, Mr Bankman-Fried positioned FTX out of business.

Varied accounts of what went incorrect have emerged since. Many got here from Mr Bankman-Fried himself, who spoke with dozens of journalists within the weeks following FTX’s collapse. Michael Lewis, an writer who was “embedded” with Mr Bankman-Fried for weeks earlier than and after it failed, has revealed a e book about him. Snippets have come from individuals tracing the motion of tokens on blockchains. The federal government revealed its concept of the case in a number of indictments. However little compares with the reams of proof that had been divulged in the course of the trial by former FTX insiders, a few of whom had been testifying in co-operation with the federal government, having pleaded responsible to fraud already.

Among the story stays the identical whatever the narrator. Mr Bankman-Fried was a gifted mathematician, who graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Know-how (MIT) in 2014 earlier than taking a job as a dealer at Jane Road Capital, a prestigious quantitative hedge fund. In 2017 he spied a chance to arrange a fund that may make the most of arbitrage alternatives in illiquid and fragmented cryptocurrency markets, which had been, per his telling, “a thousand instances as massive” than these in conventional markets. He enlisted an outdated good friend, Gary Wang, a coder he had met at maths camp, to assist arrange the fund, which he named Alameda Analysis. He employed Nishad Singh, one other coder and good friend, in addition to Caroline Ellison, a dealer he had met at Jane Road.

The tales start to diverge from right here. Ms Ellison, Mr Singh and Mr Wang all testified for the prosecution within the trial, talking for hours about their model of the dizzying ascent and devastating collapse of Alameda and FTX.

The best way Ms Ellison described it, Mr Bankman-Fried was pissed off by how little capital Alameda had. He was “very bold”. In 2019 he described FTX to Ms Ellison as “a good source of capital” for Alameda. Mr Wang testified that he wrote code that allowed Alameda to have a unfavourable steadiness on FTX—to withdraw greater than the worth of its belongings—as early as 2019. Alameda was given a line of credit score, which began small however in the end elevated to $65bn. Mr Wang additionally mentioned that he overheard a dialog wherein a dealer requested Mr Bankman-Fried if Alameda might hold withdrawing cash from the agency. Wonderful, so long as withdrawals had been lower than FTX’s buying and selling revenues, got here the reply. However lower than a 12 months after FTX was based, when Mr Wang went to verify its steadiness, Alameda had already withdrawn greater than that.

Buyer deposits are purported to be sacred, capable of be withdrawn at any time. However even months in, Alameda already gave the impression to be borrowing that cash for its personal functions. Mr Bankman-Fried mentioned that he arrange FTX as a result of he thought he might create a wonderful futures trade, quite than to fulfill a want for capital. He defined away Alameda’s privileges by saying he was solely vaguely conscious of them and had thought them vital for FTX to operate, particularly within the early days when Alameda was by far the biggest marketmaker on the trade and there have been typically bugs within the code that liquidated accounts. If Alameda was liquidated it might be catastrophic. Mr Bankman-Fried didn’t need this to occur, and he wished the fund to have the ability to make markets.

This may need been an excuse a jury might have swallowed, though, by final 12 months, Alameda was simply one in all maybe 15 main marketmakers on the trade and the others didn’t get such advantages. However two strains of argument undermined it. The primary is how the privileges had been used. The second is how Mr Bankman-Fried described FTX and its relationship with Alameda.

Begin with how Alameda used its privileges. Ms Ellison, whom Mr Bankman-Fried made co-chief govt of Alameda in 2021, when he stepped again to give attention to his trade, described the various instances Alameda withdrew severe cash from FTX. The primary was when Mr Bankman-Fried wished to purchase a stake in FTX that Binance, a rival, owned. His relationship with the boss of Binance had soured and he was fearful that regulators wouldn’t like its involvement. It was going to value round $1bn to purchase the stake, across the identical quantity of capital FTX was elevating from buyers. Ms Ellison mentioned she informed Mr Bankman-Fried “we don’t actually have the cash” and that Alameda would need to borrow from FTX to make the purchase. He told her to do it—“that’s okay, I think this is really important.”

Borrowing to cowl enterprise investments that had been illiquid made the outlet deeper. By late 2021 Mr Bankman-Fried nonetheless wished to make one other $3bn of investments. He requested Ms Ellison what would occur if the worth of shares, cryptocurrencies and enterprise investments collapsed and, as well as, FTX and Alameda struggled to safe extra funds. She calculated that it might be “virtually unimaginable” for Alameda to pay again what they’d borrowed. Nonetheless, he informed her to go forward with the funding. By the subsequent summer season, Ms Ellison had been proved proper.

Mr Singh testified at size about “extreme” spending. Around $1bn went on marketing, including Super Bowl adverts and endorsements from the likes of Tom Brady, an American footballer—around the same as FTX’s revenue in 2021. By the end, Alameda had made some $5bn in “related party” loans to Mr Bankman-Fried, Mr Wang and Mr Singh to cowl enterprise investments, property purchases and private bills. At one level, underneath cross examination, Danielle Sassoon, the prosecutor, requested Mr Bankman-Fried to verify whether or not he had flown to the Tremendous Bowl on a non-public jet. When he mentioned he was not sure, she pulled up an image of him reclining within the plush inside of a small airplane. “It was a chartered airplane, not less than,” he shrugged.

The prosecution typically used Mr Bankman-Fried’s personal phrases in opposition to him. Ms Sassoon would get Mr Bankman-Fried to say whether or not he agreed with an announcement, similar to whether or not he was walled off from buying and selling selections at Alameda. Mr Bankman-Fried would obfuscate, however finally she would pin him down. “I used to be not usually making buying and selling selections, however I used to be not walled off from info from Alameda,” he admitted. Ms Sassoon then played a clip of him claiming he “was totally walled off from trading at Alameda”. Ms Sassoon did this again and again. Like an archer she would string her bow by asking a query, then launch the arrow of proof to show a lie. At one level his lawyer slowed the tempo of proof by interrupting and asking if a doc was being provided for its reality. “Your honour, it’s the defendant’s personal statements,” the prosecutor said. “No, it’s not being offered for its truth.”

Maybe essentially the most convincing moments of the trial had been emotional ones. Ms Ellison was in tears as she informed how, within the week of FTX’s collapse, “one of many emotions I had was an amazing feeling of aid.” Meanwhile, Mr Singh described a cinematic confrontation with Mr Bankman-Fried in September last year, when he realised how big “the hole” was. He described pacing the balcony of the penthouse (value: $35m) the place many FTX staff lived, expressing horror that some $13bn of buyer cash had been borrowed, a lot of which couldn’t be paid again. In response, Mr Bankman-Fried, lounging on a deck chair, replied: “Proper, that. We’re a bit brief on deliverables.”

As clients rushed to take their cash within the week that FTX collapsed, staff resigned en masse. Adam Yedidia, one in all Mr Bankman-Fried’s associates and staff, who has not been charged with any crimes and seems to have been at midnight, texted him: “I really like you Sam, I’m not going wherever.” Days later, when he had realized the truth of what had gone on, he was gone. Lots of those that had been near Mr Bankman-Fried and knew what was happening foresaw how this might finish—those that didn’t had been horrified once they came upon. So was the jury.

(The story was first revealed on 3 November 2023)

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From The Economist, revealed underneath licence. The unique content material may be discovered on www.economist.com

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